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Abstract. Modern information society depends on reliable functionality of in-
formation systems infrastructure, while at the same time the number of cyber-
attacks has been increasing over the years and damages have been caused. Fur-
thermore, graphs can be used to show paths than can be exploited by attackers 
to intrude into systems and gain unauthorized access through vulnerability ex-
ploitation. This paper presents a method that builds attack graphs using data 
supplied from the maritime supply chain infrastructure. The method delivers all 
possible paths that can be exploited to gain access. Then, a recommendation 
system is utilized to make predictions about future attack steps within the net-
work. We show that recommender systems can be used in cyber defense by 
predicting attacks. The goal of this paper is to identify attack paths and show 
how a recommendation method can be used to classify future cyber-attacks. 
The proposed method has been experimentally evaluated and it is shown that it 
is both practical and effective. 
Keywords: Recommender systems, Cyber security, Attack graph, Exploit, 
Vulnerability, Attack prediction, Classification 
1 Introduction 
Recommender systems are decision support systems available on the web to assist 
users in the selection of item or service selection in online domains. In doing so rec-
ommender systems assist users in overcoming the information overload problem [1, 
2]. Collaborative filtering (CF) is the most widely used method for providing person-
alized recommendations. In CF systems, a database of user submitted ratings is used 
and the generated recommendations are generated on how much a user will like an 
unrated item based on previous common rated items. Thus, the recommendation pro-
cess is based on assumptions about previous rating agreements and if these agree-
ments will be maintained in the future. In addition, the ratings are used to create an n 
x m matrix with user ids, item ids and ratings, with an example of such a matrix 
shown in table 1. This database has four users and four items with values from 1 to 5. 
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The matrix is used as input when a user is requesting recommendations and for a rec-
ommendation to be generated the degree of similarity between the user who makes 
the request and the other users’ needs to be predicted using a similarity function such 
as the Pearson Correlation Similarity (PCC) [3]. At the next step a user neighborhood 
which consists of users having the highest degree of similarity is created with the 
requester. Finally, a prediction is generated after computing the average values of the 
nearest neighborhood ratings about an item, resulting in a recommendation list of 
items with the highest predicted rating values. 
 
Table 1. An Example of a Ratings Matrix 
 Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 
User 1 1 2 5 - 
User 2 4 5 4 1 
User 3 - - 3 2 
User 4 1 1 2 5 
 
 
Even though, recommender systems have been used for product or service recom-
mendation, in the current era where cyber-attacks have been increasing we show how 
they can assist in the prediction of future attacks. 
1.1 Problem definition and contributions 
Cyber-attack prevention methods are based on graph analysis to identify attack paths 
or use previous attacker knowledge in combination with intrusion alerts to provide 
defense actions in real time. A gap is identified in attack prediction and mitigation 
which can be solved with the use of suitable recommendation technologies. We have 
made the following contributions: 
 
1. We identify all attack paths in a graph according to constraints. 
2. We use the attack paths in combination with common vulnerability data to 
build a recommender system that predicts future attacks. 
1.2 Paper structure 
In section 2 relevant background work is analyzed. In section 3 the proposed method 
is explained. Section 4 presents the experimental evaluation and section 5 contains the 
conclusions and future work parts. 
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2 Background 
2.1 Collaborative filtering 
As explained above a database of ratings and a similarity function such as PCC are 
the two essential parts of the CF recommendation process. Except for the classical 
recommendation method, PCC, another similar method found in the literature is 
weighted PCC (WPCC) which extends PCC by setting a statically defined threshold 
of common rated items. However, since the definitions of PCC and WPCC numerous 
approaches have been proposed with the aim of improving the recommendations. 
TasteMiner  is a method that efficiently mines rating for learning partial users tastes 
to restrict the neighborhood size, thus reducing complexity and improving the accura-
cy of the recommendations [4]. Another CF approach that aims to improve the accu-
racy of the recommendations is entropy based can be found in the literature. In this 
approach an entropy driven similarity used to calculate the difference between ratings 
and a Manhattan distance model is then used to address the fat tail problem [5]. One 
more similarity measure for improving the accuracy of CF has been proposed with the 
name PIP. This measurement is based on Proximity, Impact and Popularity (PIP). 
Initially the proximity factor is applied to calculate the absolute difference between 
two ratings, then the impact factor is applied to show how strongly an item is pre-
ferred and finally the popularity factor is applied to how common the user ratings are. 
These three factors are then combined to calculate a final value  [6]. HU-FCF  is a 
hybrid fuzzy CF method for improved recommendations [7]. In this method, CF is 
extended with a fuzzy similarity that is calculated on user demographic data. A CF 
recommendation method based on singularities has been proposed [8]. In this method, 
the traditional similarities can be improved if contextual information from the entire 
user body are used to calculate singularities. Thus, the larger the singularity between 
users then the impact of it in the similarity is larger. Additionally, the use or power 
law augments to similarity values can be found in the literature with the name PLUS 
[9]. PLUS, is a method applied to user similarities to adjust their value using a power 
function and achieves a tradeoff between accuracy and diversity of the recommenda-
tions. Yet another approach for improved recommendations is the use of Pareto domi-
nance [10]. Pareto dominance is used initially as a pre-filtering service were the less 
promising users are eliminated from the user neighborhood. Then, the rest are used in 
a typical CF recommendation process. An additional recommendation approach in-
cludes the breakup of the user neighborhood in multiples levels [11]. This can be done 
either using a static approach  or a dynamic one [11, 12]. In both approaches the user 
similarities are adjusted either in a positive or a negative way based on the number of 
co-rated items and the PCC values and are assigned to one of multiple levels based on 
the final computed value. Thus, the predictions are made using the new user neigh-
borhood and the recommendations are improved. An additional method that can be 
used to improve the quality of the recommendations is natural noise removal [13]. 
Items and users are characterized based on their profiles and a defined strategy is used 
to eliminate natural noise, thus receiving more accurate recommendations. Also, other 
traditional approaches exist that can be used to improve CF and include the use of 
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content-boosted CF or the utilization of sparsity measures [14, 15]. COUSIN  is a 
recommendation model that improves both the accuracy and the diversity of the rec-
ommendations by using a regression model that affectively removes weak user rela-
tionships [16]. There is also an approach in the literature called Trinity  that uses his-
torical data and tags to provide personalized recommendations based on a three-
layered object-user tag network [17]. In addition to the methods mentioned already 
the use of user-item subgroups has been proposed as a way of providing improved 
recommendation systems [18]. 
2.2 Attack graph generation and analysis 
Cyber-attack prevention technologies typically use attack graph generation and analy-
sis methods to identify all possible paths that attackers can exploit to gain unauthor-
ized access to a system [19]. There are numerous methods available for attack graph 
generation and analysis. In [20] the authors use a general graph model, which is based 
on the JIGSAW specification language. Sample attack scenarios are created using 
different methods such as substitution, distribution and looping. In [21] the authors 
developed an intrusion correlator for intrusion alerts, which produces correlation 
graphs as output. Then, they use these graphs to create attack strategy graphs. The 
authors in [22] utilize modeling based approach that is used to perform an analysis of 
the security of the network. This is done using model checking tools and a model is 
presented that describes the vulnerability to attack of the network. In [23] the authors 
developed a tool called NuSMV. This is a model checking tool that implements an 
algorithm for automatic generation of attack graphs. A logic-based approach is pro-
posed in [24]. In this approach, the authors use logic rules to compute the attack graph 
and use logic deduction to reach the final facts from the initial facts. Although, this 
approach suffers from performance issues as the state grows. In [25] a Breadth-first 
search solution is used by the authors to build the attack graph.  
A layered solution is proposed where the bottom layer contains attacker privileges 
and the upper layer contains the privileges computer after each step of the algorithm. 
Once again, as the size of the graph grows there are performance issues. In [26] the 
authors propose an algorithm that only creates a graph containing the worst case sce-
narios. This approach performs better in terms of performance, but it cannot guarantee 
that all relevant paths will be returned. In [27] the authors try to reduce complexity by 
introducing the concept of group reachability. This method uses a breadth first meth-
od and uses prerequisite graphs that express reachability conditions among network 
hosts. The authors in [28] develop further the prerequisite graphs by adding infor-
mation about client-side attacks, firewalls and intrusion detection. In [29] the authors 
use a distributed attack graph generation algorithm based on a multi-agent system, a 
virtual shared memory abstraction and hyper-graph partitioning to improve the overall 
performance of the system. The method is based on depth first search and it is shown 
that the performance is improved with the use of agents after a specific graph size. In 
[30] the authors use a bidirectional search method to generate the attack graph. They 
also apply a restriction about the depth of the search, which limits the algorithm from 
identifying less possible attacks. In [31] an approach that is based on artificial intelli-
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gence with the name Planner is applied to generate the attack graph. Customized algo-
rithms are used to generate attack paths in polynomial time.  
In [32] the authors propose a graph-based approach to analyze vulnerabilities, that 
can analyze risk to a specific asset and examine possible consequence of an attack. In 
[33] the use of a probabilistic model is proposed. This model measures risk security, 
computes risk probability and considers dynamic network features. A somewhat dif-
ferent approach is proposed by the authors in [34]. The use of dynamic generation 
algorithm is proposed, that returns the top K paths. Furthermore, it is not required to 
calculate the full attack graph to return the top attack paths. NetSPA is a network 
security planning architecture that very efficiently generates the worst case attack 
graphs [35]. To do this the system uses information from software types and versions, 
intrusion detection systems, network connectivity and firewalls. In [36] the use 
Bayesian attack graph generation for dynamic security risk management.  
In [37] the authors developed a MulVAL, a logic-based network security analyzer. 
This is a vulnerability analysis tool that models the interaction of software bugs along 
with network configurations. The data about the software bugs are provided by a bug-
reporting community, while all the other relevant information is enclosed within the 
system. In addition to MulVAL, TVA is another tool for generating attack graphs [19, 
38]. TVA is based on topological analysis of network attack vulnerability and the idea 
is to exploit dependency graph to represent preconditions and postconditions and then 
exploit. At the next step, a search algorithm finds attack paths that exploit multiple 
vulnerabilities. 
3 Proposed method 
Our proposed method takes elements from both collaborative filtering recommender 
systems and attack path discovery methods to identify attacks paths and predict at-
tacks. Initially, we use an attack path discovery method that has unique characteris-
tics, such as the attacker location, the attacker capability and which the entry and 
target points are. The, attack path discovery method returns all non-circular attack 
paths that exist between assets that belong to the specified characteristics. At the next 
step, we use the attack paths along with a recommender system to predict future at-
tacks and to classify them. 
3.1 Attack path discovery 
Attackers can use a set of basic privileges that can satisfy some initial input require-
ments to gain unauthorized access to a system. Attack graphs show every possible 
path that an attacker can use to gain further privileges [19, 39]. In general, various 
vulnerabilities, such as software vulnerabilities or inappropriate configuration set-
tings, exist in information systems and can be exploited by attackers to gain access. 
An infrastructure it typically comprised of numerous nodes that can be exploited to 
intrude into the network. In addition, the number of vulnerabilities that exist on the 
network and the reachability conditions that occur are the factors that determine the 
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size of the attack graph. In, addition as the graph becomes larger, the possibility of 
more exploitation options for an attacker increases. To build the attack graph we use 
direct conditions and utilize information from open sources. Initially, the weaknesses 
defined in the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) [40] are used and at the sec-
ond step, Information from the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [41] 
database are used. A model is introduced where an attacker can gain access to infor-
mation system sources and move in a directed path. Moreover, a set of preconditions 
are specified, which include the length of the path, the location and capability of the 
attacker. The pseudocode of the attack path discovery is shown in algorithm 1. 
 
 
Algorithm 1: Attack path discovery 
Input: Asset graph (G), attacker location, attacker capability 
Output: Graph, affected assets, attack paths 
#We create two empty lists to hold attack paths and assets 
attackpaths = [] affectedassets = [] 
#We return all paths from source to target 
for e in parameters entry points 
If attacker location < required level of attacker location OR attacker capability < 
required attacker capability 
return empty graph 
 else  
get single source shortest path length  
set propagation length for entry point e 
    for target point t 
#Create a list with all non-circular paths from entry e to target t 
get all paths in the graph G from entry e to target t that are up to the pre-specified 
path length 
 for the size of paths found 
  add paths to attackpaths [] list, add affected assets to affectedassets [] list 
#Return the graph, the affected assets and the attack paths found as a direct input to 
#the attack visualization algorithm 
return Graph, affected assets, attack paths 
3.2 Attack prediction 
To recommend attack predictions we use a parameterized version of multi-level col-
laborative filtering method described in [11], although other methods could be applied 
according the scenario and the available data. This method applies collaborative filter-
ing and then rearranges the order of the k nearest neighbors according to the similarity 
value and the number of co-rated items. We use characteristics from the above-
mentioned method to classify attacks. To do that we initially apply classical collabo-
rative filtering using PCC defined in equation 1. In PCC Sim (a, b) is the similarity of 
users a and b, ra,p is the rating of user a for product p, rb,p is the rating of user b for 
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product p and ?̅?𝑎, ?̅?𝑏 represent user's average ratings. P is the set of all products. At 
the next step, we check the similarity values returned by equation 1 and the number of 
co-rated vulnerabilities. Depending on the similarity value returned and the common 
vulnerabilities, we classify these attacks from very high to very low. Finally, we 
check if there are any attack paths between the assets before the classification process 
is finished. A detailed explanation of the steps can be found in algorithm 2 which 
provides the pseudocode of the attack prediction recommender system. 
 
 
𝑆𝑖𝑚
𝑃𝐶𝐶
𝑎, 𝑏
=  
∑ 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃(𝑟𝑎, 𝑝 − ?̅?𝑎)(𝑟𝑏, 𝑝 −  ?̅?𝑏)
√∑ 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃(𝑟𝑎, 𝑝 −  ?̅?𝑎)2 √∑ 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃(𝑟𝑏, 𝑝 −  ?̅?𝑏)2
     (1) 
 
 
Algorithm 2: Attack prediction 
Input: attack paths, affected assets, vulnerabilities 
Output: predicted attacks 
#Vulnerabilities refers to common vulnerabilities between assets 
load vulnerabilities 
apply equation 1 using vulnerabilities as input 
get similarity values  
#If there are common vulnerabilities, then typically these receive the same score 
#between assets, thus, resulting in absolute similarities 
#Then we rearrange the order of the similarity by adding the number of co-rated 
#items as a constraint 
#classification refers to predicted attack classification, which is from very high to 
#very low 
then #n is the number of co-rated items and x1, x2, x3 and x4 are fixed integers 
 if n>=x1 then classification == very high 
  else if n<x1 && n>=x2 then classification == high 
   else if n<x2 && n>=x3 then classification == Medium 
    else if n<x3 && n>=x4 then classification == Low 
 else classification == very low 
then 
 get attack paths 
  if attack path exists 
   set classification == very high 
else if attack path does not exist && classification == very high then classifica-
tion == high 
  else classification == classification 
Return predicted attacks 
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4 Experimental evaluation 
The experiments took place in a simulated environment using a Pentium i7 2.8 GHz 
with 12 gigabytes of RAM, running windows 10.  The data used were supplied by the 
maritime supply chain IT infrastructure and more particular from the port of Valencia 
and the experiments were conducted within a cyber-security maritime supply chain 
risk management system. The dataset contains 26 hardware and software assets, nu-
merous vulnerabilities, with some of them being common within the assets.  Initially, 
we evaluate the attack path discovery method in terms of performance, the results of 
which are shown in table 2. Then, we present a case study that shows how to predict 
attacks utilizing the data from the maritime supply chain IT infrastructure.  
Table 2.  Performance evaluation results 
No. of test 
Attacker 
capability 
Propagation 
length 
Running 
time (sec) 
1 Low 3 <1 
2 Low 4 <1 
3 Low 5 <1 
4 Medium 3 <1 
5 Medium 4 <1 
6 Medium 5 1 
7 High 3 <1 
8 High 4 1 
9 Hugh 5 1.2 
4.1 Case study: The maritime supply chain IT infrastructure  
The maritime supply chain infrastructure it typically comprised of numerous assets 
that can be exploited to gain access and reach specific assets by popping from one to 
another. For the case study, we have used a snippet of data derived from the Valencia 
port IT infrastructure. In table 3 the data used show the common vulnerabilities be-
tween assets and their respective score. Assets 1, 2 and 3 are hardware assets, while 
the description column represents the vulnerable software asset that is installed on the 
respective hardware asset. Furthermore, the assets and attacks paths between them are 
a vital part of risk assessment. The following non-circular attack paths are present in 
the system: 
1. Asset1  Asset2 
2. Asset2  Asset3 
3. Asset2  Asset1 
However, it should be noted that attack paths might vary according to the specific 
settings used, such as the propagation length, attacker location, capability, entry and 
target points. 
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Table 3.  Common vulnerabilities 
Assets Description 
CVE 
2015-1769 
CVE 
2015-2423 
CVE 
2015-2433 
CVE 
2015-2485 
Asset 1 
(Desktop 
PC) 
Windows 10 
Installed on 
Desktop PC 
10 2.9 2.9 10 
Asset 2 
(Laptop 1) 
Windows 10 
Installed on 
Laptop 1 
10 2.9 2.9 10 
Asset 3 
(Laptop 2) 
Windows 10 
Installed on 
Laptop 2 
10 2.9 2.9 - 
 
 
Then the administrator executed algorithm 2 to predict very high and high classifica-
tion attacks. Moreover, for the case study we have assigned the minimum number of 
co-rated items to be 3 for very high classification and 2 for high classification. Thus, 
algorithm 2 classified: 
1. Asset1  Asset2 as very high  
2. Asset2  Asset1 as very high 
3. Asset1  Asset3 as high 
4. Asset3  Asset1 as high  
5. Asset2  Asset3 as high 
6. Asset3  Asset2 as high 
 
At the next step, the method checked for attack path relations between the assets and 
rearranged the classifications. Thus, the administrator received the following final 
predictions:  
 
1. Asset1  Asset2 as very high 
2. Asset2  Asset1 as very high 
3. Asset2  Asset3 as very high 
4. Asset1  Asset3 as high 
5. Asset3  Asset1 as high 
6. Asset3  Asset2 as high 
4.2 Discussion 
Cyber-attack prediction systems are important in risk management to provide mitiga-
tion solutions. To do that the identification of possible attack scenarios and providing 
defensive solutions for assets protection are the two most important parts. Further-
more, it is important for this to take place within a reasonable amount of time. It is 
shown that within a small amount of time the attack path discovery method delivers 
the non-circular attack paths between assets. Furthermore, at the next stage a classifi-
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cation list is created that provides a prediction list of attack movement between assets. 
For example, the likelihood that an attacker who gained access to asset 1 to explore 
the possibility of gaining access to asset 4 is higher when compared to gaining access 
to either asset 2 or asset 3. However, the possibility of common vulnerabilities receiv-
ing different scores in different assets should be further exploited since this will result 
in different classification scales. 
5 Conclusions and future work 
Various online services use recommender systems for product or service recommen-
dation. However, the use of such systems in the cyber-defense domain has not been 
explored. In this paper, we proposed a collaborative filtering based recommender 
system that uses common vulnerabilities between assets, identifies attack paths and 
combines the information to recommend future attacks. Although, the method is prac-
tical, it could become more effective if certain aspects are extended. Thus, in the fu-
ture, we aim to investigate the following directions: 
Path length recommendation. We aim to apply recommendation techniques to dy-
namically identify the length of the path that should be searched, thus making the 
attack path discovery process faster. 
Attack recommendation. A part of our research will concentrate on more intelligent 
approaches for cyber-attack predictions based on advanced methods. 
Defense recommendation. Another research direction will focus on defense strategy 
recommendation. 
Prediction Validation. We aim to validate the attack predictions using real data from 
real world scenarios along with expert consultation. 
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